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Expensive Speech: Citizens United v. FEC and the
Free Speech Rights of Tax-Exempt Religious
Organizations
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC1
entered the national consciousness amid more than its fair share of
controversy. During his 2010 State of the Union Address, with many
of the robe-clad justices of the Supreme Court sitting front and
center in the House Chambers, President Obama castigated the
Court for “revers[ing] a century of law that [he] believe[d] [would]
open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign
corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”2
The President’s criticism, warranted or not, prompted immediate
standing applause from many members of the House and Senate and
a very surprising reaction from one member of the Supreme Court.
Although the Justices have historically remained silent and
unresponsive during the State of the Union Address, Justice Alito
could not restrain himself from reacting to what he viewed as the
President’s misstatement of the key holding and potential
ramifications of Citizens United. Shaking his head and mouthing
what appeared to be the words “not true,” Justice Alito made his
disagreement with the President clear to a world audience. This
controversial exchange, which provided enough fodder to fill several
days of twenty-four hour news channel programming, demonstrated
how impassioned individuals can become when money and political
speech are at issue. It also made clear that even after over 200 years
of constitutional interpretation, significant First Amendment
questions remain in flux.
The central holding in Citizens United is that, under the First
Amendment, “the Government cannot restrict political speech based
on the speaker’s corporate identity.”3 With that question answered,
at least for the time being, it is now left to the legal world to
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
3. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
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consider what the broader impact of this decision will be moving
forward. Many serious questions remain as to how this holding will
affect free speech rights and political campaigns. For instance, it
remains unclear how this decision will affect the involvement of
foreign corporations in American politics or the exact nature of
Political Action Committees (“PACs”) under the new framework.
Additionally, there is significant uncertainty regarding the impact
Citizens United will have on tax-exempt religious organizations that
are restricted from engaging in political activities under § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code.4 Although each of these questions is
worth serious review in light of Citizens United, this Note will focus
specifically on the last question—how the decision in Citizens United
affects tax-exempt religious organizations under § 501(c)(3).
Under § 501(c)(3) certain organizations, including those
“organized and operated exclusively for religious [or] charitable . . .
purposes,” are exempt from paying federal taxes as long as they
adhere to certain restrictions.5 These restrictions include limits on
lobbying activities and participation in political campaigns.6 Over the
years there have been a number of legal challenges to this political
activities restriction, yet all have failed to overturn the prohibition.7
It is likely, however, that in light of the holding in Citizens United,
new challenges to this restriction will arise.8 As such, it is helpful to
anticipate the issues that may arise with these potential challenges,
including whether or not Citizens United even applies to tax-exempt
religious organizations and, if so, how that holding affects their
rights under § 501(c)(3). With a new emphasis on First Amendment
political speech rights under the Citizens United decision, it is likely
4. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Brave New World of Political Spending for Nonprofits,
NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_
20100312_4650.php#.
5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). For an overview of the history of and policy justifications
for religious tax exemptions, see Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971 (1999).
6. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
7. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
8. See MILTON CERNY, DOUGLAS W. CHARNAS & MICHELE A. W. MCKINNON,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, CITIZENS UNITED CHANGED LANDSCAPE: MAY PRODUCE SOME
LANDMINES
FOR
NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS,
Feb.
10,
2010,
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/news/
4532.asp?SearchFor=unconstitutional.
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that any challenge to the § 501(c)(3) restrictions would be based on
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which limits the types of
conditions government can place on the benefits it provides.9
Although this doctrine has been used to make similar arguments in
the past,10 the new First Amendment paradigm established by the
Citizens United holding has changed the legal landscape on this
issue. This Note contends that, based on this new free speech
paradigm, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been given
renewed strength in the argument against conditioning the benefit
of tax exemption for religious organizations on the willingness of
those organizations to give up their First Amendment speech rights.
This Note also argues, however, that in light of other interests,
including adherence to the Establishment Clause and the longrecognized tradition of separation of church and state, some limits
on the political activities of tax-exempt religious organizations
should remain intact, preventing such organizations from
maintaining tax-exempt status if they engage in completely
unfettered political speech or lobbying.
Part II of this Note reviews the background and central holding
of Citizens United as well as the general provisions of § 501(c)(3)
and the related restrictions, focusing specifically on the political
activities test. Part III provides an overview of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, including a summary of the Supreme
Court unconstitutional conditions cases most relevant to this issue.
Part IV uses the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to analyze
the legality of § 501(c)(3)’s political activities restriction for religious
organizations in light of the decision in Citizens United. Part IV also
considers the arguments against allowing tax-exempt religious
organizations to engage in completely unfettered political activities
and discusses possible limits that should continue to govern such
organizations. Part V concludes this Note.

9. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: A NEW PIECE IN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT PUZZLE
A.

Background and History

In 2007, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with the
stated purpose of “restoring our government to citizens’ control,”11
released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie in an attempt to inform
and influence voters during the 2008 presidential election.12 The
film, a politically charged documentary that was highly critical of
Hillary Clinton and her husband, was initially made available in
theaters and through DVD sales.13 However, in an effort to make the
film accessible to an even broader audience, Citizens United also
wanted to distribute the film through video-on-demand, which
allows those who subscribe to digital cable systems to select the
video at any time from an on-screen menu.14 Accordingly, Citizens
United sought an agreement with a cable company, which offered to
make the film available to its subscribers.15 Additionally, Citizens
United filmed three television commercials promoting the film and
planned to pay for the costs associated with airing those ads.16
Under federal law, corporations and unions are prohibited from
“using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in
connection with certain qualified federal elections.”17 The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 extended this prohibition to
“electioneering communication,”18 which includes “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office; . . . made within 60 days before a
general, special, or runoff election . . . or 30 days before a primary or
preference election.”19 Based on this statutory language, Citizens
United feared it would face civil and criminal repercussions if it
11. About Citizens United, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/
about.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
18. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
19. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
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offered the film, as planned, through video-on-demand within thirty
days of the primary election.20 As such, before moving forward with
the plan, Citizens United sought a declaratory judgment on the
matter, as well as an injunction against any potential FEC action.21
The district court denied this motion and granted the FEC’s motion
for summary judgment.22 The Supreme Court docketed the case in
August 200823 and finally heard oral arguments in March 2009.24
Despite the fact that the 2008 presidential election had long since
passed by the time oral arguments were heard, the Court took up the
case because, in its view, there were much broader issues at hand
than simply whether or not Citizens United would be in violation of
§ 441b.25 The more pressing issues, as the Court viewed them—and
certainly those with the most potential for a lasting impact on First
Amendment jurisprudence—are those dealing with whether or not
§ 441b and other restrictions of the free speech of corporations are
even constitutional.26
B. The Court’s Reasoning
1. The applicability of 2 U.S.C. § 441b
The Court in Citizens United, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, began its analysis of the key issues by looking at whether
or not § 441b was applicable to the activities of Citizens United.27
Citizens United had argued that the film did not fit within the
definition of “electioneering communication” because it “was not
‘publicly distributed.’”28 This argument was based on the fact that
the video-on-demand nature of distribution limited the viewership to
only those who requested the film, meaning, at least under Citizens
United’s interpretation, that the transmission would be seen by one
person or one household—not the 50,000 or more viewers required
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
21. Id.
22. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).
23. Id., appeal docketed, No. 08-205 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2008).
24. Robert Barnes, ‘Hillary: The Movie’ to Get Supreme Court Screening, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/03/14/AR2009031401603_pf.html.
25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 888–89.
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under the statute.29 Citizens United also argued that because Hillary
is simply a “‘documentary film that examines certain historical
events’”—not express advocacy or its “functional equivalent”—it did
not fall under the provisions of § 441b.30 The Court rejected both
arguments.31
First, the Court determined that the video-on-demand feature
did not limit the “public” nature of the film’s distribution as Citizens
United had argued.32 Although it is true that under the video-ondemand format the film is requested on an individual basis and is not
broadcast automatically to a large number of people, the Court
found that the determination of whether or not a cable transmission
is “publicly distributed” is whether or not it “‘can be received by
50,000 or more persons.’”33 In this case, the Court found that the
distribution of Hillary clearly met that criterion.34 On the question
of whether or not Hillary constituted express advocacy, another
requirement under the statute, the Court determined that “there is
no reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to
vote against Senator Clinton.”35 Under this conclusion, the Court
held that the film qualified as the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, making § 441b applicable to Citizens United’s actions.36
Having made this determination, the Court turned to the more
difficult and certainly more controversial analysis of the
constitutionality of § 441b and the claim that the statute violates the
free speech rights of Citizens United.37
2. First Amendment concerns of § 441b
The Court could not resolve the question regarding the
constitutionality of § 441b with the same ease with which it disposed
of the question of § 441b’s applicability. In deciding this issue, the
majority’s analysis included a rather lengthy and detailed review of
First Amendment history and jurisprudence.38 Appropriately,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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Id. at 889.
Id. at 889–90.
Id.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
Id. at 889.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 896–99.
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however, this analysis began with the simplicity of the constitutional
language itself: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”39 This language, with its outright proscription
on the abridgment of free speech, provides the framework with
which to view the entirety of the majority’s reasoning. “Speech,”
argued Justice Kennedy, “is an essential mechanism of democracy,
for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”40
Because such speech is so critical to the proper functioning of our
democracy, reasoned the majority, the government is restricted from
“allowing speech by some but not others.”41 This means, at least
according to Justice Kennedy and the majority, that “political speech
does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source
is a corporation.’”42 Therefore, the restrictions placed on such speech
by § 441b are unconstitutional. As simple as this reasoning may
sound, in order to reach this controversial decision, the majority had
to address, and ultimately overturn, years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Over the last fifty years, several major cases have addressed the
issue of corporate First Amendment rights, and some of them have
reached conclusions in direct opposition to the majority’s holding in
Citizens United. Chief among these cases is Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, which held that political speech can, in fact,
be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.43 As Kennedy
noted, quoting directly from his own dissent in Austin, the Austin
Court “‘upheld a direct restriction on the independent expenditure
of funds for political speech for the first time in [this Court’s]
history.’”44 To justify this precedent, the Austin Court had to create
or “identify” a new government interest—the antidistortion
interest.45
According to the Austin majority, the antidistortion interest
consists of preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
39. Id. at 896; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784
(1978)).
43. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
44. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
45. Id.; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”46 In other
words, the Austin Court was concerned about the “unfair
advantage” that corporations would have “in the political
marketplace” due to their corporate wealth, and the Austin Court
believed this concern justified an attempt to “equalize” the relative
influence of competing voices in American politics.47 The Citizens
United majority did not buy this argument. Citing a number of
significant pre-Austin Court decisions for support, the Citizens
United Court reasoned: “The First Amendment’s protections do not
depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public
discussion.’”48 Rather, “political speech” is “political speech” and is
“‘indispensable . . . [whether it] comes from a corporation [or] an
individual.’”49 According to Kennedy, rather than “interfere[] with
the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas”50 by controlling who can and
cannot speak, the Court and Congress should let the First
Amendment govern and “[f]actions should be checked by permitting
them all to speak and by entrusting the people to judge what is true
and what is false.”51 Under this reasoning, Citizens United overruled
Austin, “‘effectively invalidat[ing] not only BCRA Section 203, but
also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition . . . for express advocacy.’”52 This
decision, according to the majority, simply restored the pre-Austin
line of precedent from First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and
Buckley v. Valeo, returning to an interpretation of the First
Amendment that does not allow the government to “suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”53 It
is this holding that drew the ire of President Obama and raises the
potential for a number of new questions and legal challenges,
including those related to the First Amendment rights of religious
organizations exempt from taxes under § 501(c)(3).
46.
47.
(1986)).
48.
(1976)).
49.
50.
(2008)).
51.
52.
53.
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Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
Id. at 659–60 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49
Id. (quoting First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
Id. at 906 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
Id. at 907 (citation omitted).
Id. at 913.
Id.
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IRS § 501(c)(3): Tax-Exempt Religious Organizations

Before analyzing how the holding from Citizens United will
affect tax-exempt religious organizations, it is first necessary to
review the basic definition of a tax-exempt religious organization and
the statutory restrictions to which such an organization must adhere.
This definition and the associated restrictions are found in
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and the corresponding
IRS regulations. Under § 501(c)(3), an organization is exempt from
Federal income taxes if it is
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . . [so long as] no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation . . . , and which does not participate in, or intervene
in . . . , any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office.54

In essence, an organization may receive and maintain tax-exempt
status if it meets each of four tests: (1) the organizational test;55 (2)
the operational test;56 (3) the private inurement test;57 and (4) the
political activities test.58 Although failing any one of these tests will
place an organization in jeopardy of losing its tax-exempt status, this
Note will focus primarily on the political activities test because that is
the test most likely to be affected by the holding in Citizens United.
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to consider the restrictions of this test
in more depth.

54. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
55. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2010) (“An organization is organized exclusively
for one or more exempt purposes only if its articles of organization . . . (a) Limit the purposes
. . . to one or more exempt purposes; and (b) Do not expressly empower the organization to
engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves
are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”).
56. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (“An organization will be regarded as operated exclusively
for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one
or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose.”).
57. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (“An organization is not operated exclusively for one
or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals.”).
58. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
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According to the IRS regulations governing the political
activities test,
An organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt
purposes if . . . a substantial part of its activities is attempting to
influence legislation . . . [or] it participates or intervenes, directly or
indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office.59

Under these regulations tax-exempt religious organizations, and
any other § 501(c)(3) organization for that matter, are severely
limited in the types of political activities in which they can engage.60
That is not to say, however, that such organizations are banned
completely from any type of political activity. Even though the
statutory language requires that a tax-exempt organization be
operated “exclusively” for one of the exempt purposes, this absolute
language is tempered by the fact that the IRS regulations allow an
organization to engage in certain non-exempt activities so long as
such activities do not constitute a “primary” part of that
organization’s activities.61 Thus, tax-exempt religious organizations
do have some latitude to engage in lobbying activities, but in doing
so they run the risk of crossing the somewhat undefined boundary
into non-exempt status.62
With such extreme limits on the ability of tax-exempt religious
organizations to engage in political activities without losing their
exemptions, it should come as no surprise that a number of such
organizations have challenged this element of § 501(c)(3) as
unconstitutionally restrictive.63 One of the most famous of these
challenges came in the 1972 case Christian Echoes National Ministry,
Inc. v. United States, in which Christian Echoes National Ministry, a
nonprofit religious corporation, sued the United States government
for a refund of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes
under the claim that the organization was exempt under
§ 501(c)(3).64
59. Id. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i) to (iii).
60. See id.
61. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e).
62. For further discussion of the restrictions on political activity of § 501(c)(3)
organizations, see Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations?, 40 IND. L.
REV. 73 (2007).
63. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
64. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 851 (10th
Cir. 1972).
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Christian Echoes filed suit after the IRS revoked its tax-exempt
status on the grounds that the organization “had engaged in
substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation; and . . . had
directly and indirectly intervened in political campaigns on behalf of
candidates for public office.”65 Following an examination of
Christian Echoes’s activities, the IRS found that it had published a
number of pamphlets and articles attempting to influence directly
public opinion on specific legislation, including bills related to civil
rights, Medicare, and firearms control, among many others.66
Christian Echoes had also intervened in federal elections in an
attempt to elect conservative politicians like Strom Thurmond and
Barry Goldwater and defeat liberal politicians like Lyndon Johnson
and Hubert Humphrey.67 On these grounds, the IRS found that
Christian Echoes had violated the political activities test of
§ 501(c)(3) and could no longer be considered tax-exempt under
the statute.68
In its suit, Christian Echoes claimed that the political activities
test violated both the free exercise and the free speech clauses of the
First Amendment.69 The Tenth Circuit rejected both claims,
reasoning that “First Amendment rights are not absolutes and that
courts must balance [these] freedoms against the congressional
enactment . . . .”70 The court also held that because “tax exemption
is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right, . . . the limitations
contained in Section 501(c)(3) . . . do not deprive Christian Echoes
of its constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.”71 Under the
court’s reasoning, the limits of § 501(c)(3) do not restrain a religious
organization from exercising its First Amendment rights.72 An
organization must simply make a choice between exercising its First
Amendment free speech rights and receiving the “privilege” of tax
exemption.73
This reasoning begs the question of whether or not the
government may permissibly condition a privilege such as tax
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 853.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 852–53.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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exemption on the willingness of an organization (or individual, for
that matter) to give up its constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
has dealt with this question numerous times, leading to a longstanding legal doctrine known as the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. Because this issue is the focus of this Note, before
moving forward with the analysis of Citizens United’s impact on the
rights of § 501(c)(3) religious organizations, it is necessary to review
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence governing it.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
At surface level, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
seems simple and straightforward. In reality, however, decades of
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence have demonstrated that
applying the doctrine is much more complicated and inconsistent
than one might imagine. In short, the doctrine stands for the
principle “that government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether.”74 Put differently,
an unconstitutional condition may exist “when government offers a
benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity
that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from
government interference.”75 This is not to say, of course, that the
government may not attach certain restrictions or burdens to any
benefit it provides. In fact, most benefits provided by the
government have certain conditions attached. After all, one would be
hard pressed to argue that something as ordinary as driving on a
74. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1415.
75. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1421–22. In a few limited cases, the Supreme Court has
held that no unconstitutional condition exists where there is “rough proportionality” or an
“essential nexus” between the benefit conferred and the constitutional right implicated. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987). This suggests that an unconstitutional condition exists only when “the government
. . . require[s] a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to
the property.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. However, the Court has never extended this “essential
nexus” requirement beyond “cases where the state requires land to be dedicated to public use
in exchange for permits to develop other portions of the property.” Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 46 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)). Thus, because these proportionality concerns are
implicated only in the realm of the Takings Clause, there is no need to discuss the “essential
nexus” any further in this Note.
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government owned road does not come with certain conditions such
as obeying the speed limit or stopping at red lights. What
distinguishes an unconstitutional condition from a permissible
condition is that the unconstitutional condition implicates “those
rights that depend on some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by
the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech, exercise of
religion or privacy.”76 Thus, unconstitutional conditions problems
often arise in cases involving First Amendment rights.
Several Supreme Court cases have addressed the doctrine in the
context of First Amendment claims. In each case the Court
emphasized that “‘the government “may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . .
freedom of speech” even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’”77
This raises the question that is the focus of this Note: in light of the
Court’s decision in Citizens United reaffirming the importance of
First Amendment political speech rights, is it an unconstitutional
condition to require religious organizations to give up their free
speech rights in order to receive a tax exemption? Although this
question has been asked before (with no perfectly clear answer), the
Citizens United decision adds a new piece to the puzzle, requiring a
fresh analysis of this issue. Key to this analysis is the Supreme Court’s
relevant jurisprudence related to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, tax exemptions, and the First Amendment free speech
rights of religious organizations.
A.

Key Cases Involving the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions

Three of the key cases involving the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions are Speiser v. Randall, Sherbert v. Verner, and Perry v.
Sinderman. These cases, respectively, are discussed in the following
sections.
1. Speiser v. Randall
Although the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was first
created during the Lochner era,78 the doctrine really began to take

76. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1426.
77. United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting
Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))).
78. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1416.
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shape more recently in Speiser v. Randall,79 a case decided by the
Supreme Court in 1958. In Speiser, a taxpayer challenged a provision
in the California Constitution providing that “no person or
organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of
the United States or the State by force or violence” is eligible to
“[r]eceive any exemption from any tax imposed by this State.”80 The
taxpayer in this case, a World War II veteran, was denied a veterans’
property tax exemption on the grounds that he refused to make an
oath that he would “not advocate the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or the State of California,” as required by the
application for tax exemption.81 In his complaint, the taxpayer
claimed that conditioning a tax exemption on such an oath is
“forbidden by the Federal Constitution”82 because it denies
“freedom of speech without the procedural safeguards required by
the Due Process Clause.”83 In addressing this claim, the Court
reasoned that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such
speech.”84 In effect it would be “the same as if the State were to fine
them for this speech.”85 Most importantly, perhaps, the Court
rejected the State of California’s contention that denial of a tax
exemption does “not infringe speech” because this exemption “is a
‘privilege,’” not a right.86 As will be demonstrated below, this
“privilege” versus “right” issue continues to be a major element of
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence, which will most certainly
have important implications on any future decision related to taxexempt religious organizations.

79. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
80. Id. at 516 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19).
81. Id. at 514–15.
82. Id. at 515.
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. at 518.
85. Id.
86. Id. This reasoning should be compared to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Christian
Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, discussed above. In that case, as noted above,
the court held that because a tax exemption is a privilege, not a right, “withholding exemption
from nonprofit corporations [does] not deprive [them] of [their] constitutionally guaranteed
right of free speech.” 470 F.2d 849, 857 (1972).
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2. Sherbert v. Verner to Perry v. Sindermann
Just five years after the Speiser decision, the Supreme Court once
again faced an unconstitutional conditions question in Sherbert v.
Verner.87 Unlike Speiser, however, the dispute in Sherbert dealt
specifically with religious issues, adding an important element to the
development of the unconstitutional conditions puzzle. In Sherbert,
the appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, lost
her job for refusing to work on Saturday, which she considered to be
the Sabbath Day.88 Following her termination, appellant was unable
to find another job due to the same religious restrictions.89 As such,
when she attempted to secure unemployment benefits she was
denied by the state government.90 South Carolina law provided that
“to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be ‘able to work and . . .
available for work” and that “if . . . [a claimant] has failed, without
good cause . . . to accept available suitable work,’ she will not be
eligible to receive unemployment benefits.91 Unsurprisingly, the
appellant challenged this law and the government’s refusal to provide
unemployment benefits as an infringement of her free exercise rights
under the First Amendment.92
The Court sided with the appellant on this issue, determining
that the denial of benefits in this instance did, in fact, impose an
unconstitutional burden on the individual rights of the appellant.93
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, argued that “[i]t is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege.”94 In the Court’s mind, it made no difference whether the
benefit at issue was a “right” or a privilege.95 Relying heavily on
Speiser, the Sherbert Court held “that conditions upon public
benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 399–401.
Id. at 400–01(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
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purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.”96 This is true even when the benefit is “gratuitous.”97
This reasoning was reiterated nearly a decade later in Perry v.
Sindermann,98 in which the Court reviewed the case of a stateemployed teacher whose contract was not renewed because, as he
claimed, he had been critical of the Board of Regents.99 The Board’s
action, he alleged, infringed upon his First Amendment freedom of
speech.100 Although this case was ultimately decided on grounds
largely unrelated to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
Court reviewed the principles of the doctrine to ensure that the
denied contract renewal had not been based on an unconstitutional
condition.101 In language reminiscent of both Speiser and Sherbert,
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, reasoned:
[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.102

Once again, the Court emphasized the unique position of First
Amendment rights, especially freedom of speech, by rejecting the
notion that receipt of a governmental benefit could be based on
some condition that interferes with a constitutional right. Although
the Speiser, Sherbert, and Perry Courts emphatically argued against
such conditions, the Court has, in more recent years, injected
significant inconsistency into the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, carving out a number of exceptions governing its
application. This Note turns now to a review of the cases most
relevant to these exceptions.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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Id. at 405 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
Id.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 596–98.
Id. at 597.
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B. Cases that Undermine the Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions
1. Regan v. Taxation with Representation
Unlike the cases discussed above, Regan v. Taxation with
Representation,103 decided in 1983, was the first major Supreme
Court case to consider the political activities restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3) within the framework of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.104 Undoubtedly, any future challenge to the § 501(c)(3)
political activities restriction under the new Citizens United
framework will be forced to reconcile the Court’s holding in Regan.
As such, it is important to understand the facts and reasoning of this
case in order to understand the potential distinctions that may be
drawn between Regan and future challenges to § 501(c)(3).
a. Facts and procedural history. In Regan, a nonprofit
corporation, Taxation with Representation (“TWR”), filed suit after
the IRS denied its application for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3)
for what appeared to be substantial lobbying activities.105 TWR was
initially organized as a nonprofit charitable and educational
organization with the goal of “represent[ing] the general public on
tax issues before Congress, the courts, and the executive branch.”106
Not surprisingly, to accomplish this goal, TWR engaged in
substantial lobbying activities, placing the organization in direct
violation of the political activities test of § 501(c)(3).107 As a result of
these lobbying activities, TWR became ineligible for the tax
exemption typically allowed for charitable and educational nonprofit
corporations under § 501(c)(3).108 The suit filed by TWR after the
adverse determination by the IRS alleged that the § 501(c)(3)
provision on which the denial of tax exemption was based was
unconstitutional because it conditioned a governmental benefit on
the willingness of an organization to give up its First Amendment
free speech rights.109 This unconstitutional conditions claim was
103. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
104. Id. at 542.
105. Id.
106. Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 718.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 725. TWR also claimed that the IRS’s denial of its application for tax
exemption violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.

2259

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/8/2011 4:34 PM

2010

rejected by both the district court and the circuit court, leading to an
appeal heard by the Supreme Court.110 Once again, TWR’s
unconstitutional conditions argument was rejected, and the political
activities test of § 501(c)(3) was upheld as it relates to nonprofit
organizations.111
b. The Court’s holding and analysis. In analyzing TWR’s
unconstitutional conditions claim, the Regan Court looked first to
precedents it had established in Speiser and its progeny.112 The Court
conceded that in the past it had “held that the government may not
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
right.”113 However, the Court refused to apply the Speiser model to
this case.114 Instead, the Regan Court based its analysis on the rule
established in Cammarano v. United States,115 a case decided less
than one year after the Speiser decision.
The dispute in Cammarano centered on the question of whether
an IRS regulation disallowing taxpayers from deducting money used
to defeat legislation as a business expense was permissible under the
Constitution.116 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan,
held that the First Amendment does not require the government to
subsidize lobbying activities.117 The Court based this holding on the
reasoning that such a tax deduction was not denied because the
taxpayers were “engag[ing] in constitutionally protected activities”;
rather, the regulation simply required taxpayers “to pay for those
activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging
in similar activities is required to do under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.”118 The Regan Court relied heavily on this
reasoning, ultimately concluding that, consistent with Cammarano,
§ 501(c)(3)’s restriction on political activities is constitutional
because it does not prohibit First Amendment speech.119 Instead,
However, this claim and the Court’s related reasoning will not be discussed here, as it is not
critical to the focus of this Note.
110. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.
111. Id. at 545–48.
112. Id. at 545.
113. Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
114. Id.
115. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
116. Id. at 499–500.
117. Id. at 513; see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
118. Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
119. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.
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§ 501(c)(3) simply upholds the principle that Congress will not
subsidize political activities through tax exemptions, which,
according to the Court, have “much the same effect as a cash grant
to the organization.”120 In other words, “although government may
not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise of . . .
freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own
creation.”121
In the case of TWR, the Court concluded that tax exemptions
are “a matter of [congressional] grace”122 and that even if the
organization “does not have as much money as it wants, and thus
cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the
Constitution ‘does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may
be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’”123 The
Court also found that TWR could continue to lobby while still
maintaining tax exemption on its non-lobbying activities by creating
a “dual structure” in which it maintained “a § 501(c)(3)
organization for its nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4)
organization for lobbying.”124 Although § 501(c)(4) organizations
are also tax-exempt, they differ from § 501(c)(3) organizations in
that contributions made to a § 501(c)(4) organization are not
deductible.125 Additionally, a § 501(c)(4) organization “may engage
in an unlimited amount of lobbying, provided that the lobbying is
related to the organization’s exempt purpose” and may also “engage
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for
public office provided that such intervention does not constitute the
organization’s primary activity.”126 The availability of this option,
reasoned the Court, also undermined TWR’s unconstitutional
conditions claim on the grounds that a reasonable alternative to
giving up First Amendment free speech rights existed.127

120. Id. at 544–46.
121. Id. at 549–50 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
122. Id. at 549 (quoting Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
123. Id. at 550 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 318)).
124. Id. at 544.
125. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B) (2010).
126. John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying
Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, IRS, EXEMPT ORGS.TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM, FY 2003, at L-2, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
127. Regan, 461 U.S. at 543–46 (1983).
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In his concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, Justice Blackmun offered some noteworthy reasoning
of his own regarding TWR’s unconstitutional conditions claim.
Although he agreed with the majority’s final holding on the First
Amendment claim, Justice Blackmun felt the need to distance
himself from certain elements of the reasoning on which that
holding was based. In Justice Blackmun’s opinion:
If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained in
§ 501(c)(3) violates the principle . . . “that the government may
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
right.” Section 501(c)(3) does not merely deny a subsidy for
lobbying activities, it deprives an otherwise eligible organization of
its tax-exempt status and its eligibility to receive tax-deductible
contributions for all its activities, whenever one of those activities is
“substantial lobbying.” Because lobbying is protected by the First
Amendment . . . , § 501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit
to organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights.128

By this reasoning, the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3) is saved
only by the existence of the less restrictive § 501(c)(4) option.129 In
fact, as Justice Blackmun argued, if that option were eliminated or
subjected to further restrictions, “the First Amendment problems
would be insurmountable. . . . [A]ny such restriction would render
the statutory scheme unconstitutional.”130
It is the majority’s opinion that is controlling, of course—not
Justice Blackmun’s. Thus, the rule to be taken from Regan is that
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activities restriction, as applied to a nonprofit
tax-exempt organization, does not violate the First Amendment
because it does not prevent an organization from engaging in
political speech. The restriction simply supports the notion that
government will not subsidize that speech. Although this is the
majority holding, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence raises a number of
compelling issues that will be explored in Part IV, especially his
argument regarding the scenario without the less restrictive option
under § 501(c)(4).
It is important to note, however, that the Regan Court
considered the restrictions of § 501(c)(3) only as they applied to a

128. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 553–54.
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non-profit corporation, not a religious organization.131 As discussed
below,132 this is an important distinction, one that is critical to the
focus of this Note. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never
specifically addressed the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political
speech restrictions as applied to religious organizations. However,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti.133
In Branch Ministries, a church challenged the revocation of its
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status after it engaged in campaigning
against a presidential candidate.134 Just four days prior to the
presidential election in 1992, Branch Ministries took out two fullpage newspaper advertisements in an attempt to persuade “Christians
not to vote for then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton because of his
positions on certain moral issues.”135 As a result of this political
activity, the IRS revoked Branch Ministries’ tax-exempt status.136 In
its complaint, the church claimed that this revocation, and the
§ 501(c)(3) restrictions on which it was based, violated the First
Amendment by restricting speech.137 The circuit court rejected this
argument, relying heavily on Regan in its decision. Like the
reasoning of the Regan majority, the Branch Ministries court held
that despite the strict limitations on political speech under
§ 501(c)(3), the church had less restrictive options, including the
creation of a § 501(c)(4) entity, by which it could engage in political
activities.138 The Branch Ministries court went on to explain that
once a § 501(c)(4) entity had been created, that entity could also
create a Political Action Committee (“PAC”) “that would be free to
participate in political campaigns” without limitations on the amount
of funding it could provide, just as long as that funding did not
come from the church’s tax-free dollars.139 The availability of these
options, along with the court’s conclusion that the government need
not subsidize the free speech rights of a church, led the circuit court

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Regan, 461 U.S. 540.
See infra Part IV.
211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
Id at 143.
Id.
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to uphold the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political speech
restrictions, even as they apply to a religious organization.
This exact position involving religious organizations has never
been adopted or even addressed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the
circuit court’s decision regarding the constitutionality of
§ 501(c)(3)’s political speech restrictions, at least as it applies to
religious organizations, is not controlling outside of the D.C.
Circuit. This holding may, in fact, inform the Supreme Court’s
decision on any future challenges to § 501(c)(3), particularly in its
reliance on Regan. However, because there may be a slight gap in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, there is potential for a successful
challenge to such a restriction on political speech, particularly in light
of Citizens United. This Note now discusses that possibility.
IV. ANALYSIS
Under the newly established framework of Citizens United, a
corporation is now considered a person for the purposes of First
Amendment free speech rights. Although this decision did not deal
specifically with § 501(c)(3) organizations, the general First
Amendment principle of the Citizens United holding is likely to have
significant implications on the political speech rights of all taxexempt § 501(c)(3) organizations, especially religious organizations.
As it currently stands, Citizens United made no changes to the
restrictions of the § 501(c)(3) political activities test, meaning that
even though a § 501(c)(3) organization may be considered a person
with respect to First Amendment rights, exercising those rights in
the political context will still jeopardize the tax-exempt status of that
organization. That being said, the Citizens United decision has
opened the door for tax-exempt organizations to challenge the
constitutionality of these political activity restrictions of § 501(c)(3)
on the grounds that such restrictions unconstitutionally condition a
benefit (i.e., a tax exemption) on an organization’s willingness to
give up its First Amendment free speech rights.
Given the history of § 501(c)(3) case law discussed above,140
such legal challenges will face an uphill battle. However, in light of
the holding and language of the Citizens United decision, many of
the previous decisions in this area of the law can be distinguished,
bringing new life to the possibility of eliminating the political
140. See supra Part III.
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activities restriction of § 501(c)(3). This Note turns now to a
discussion of the challenges to § 501(c)(3)’s political speech
restrictions that tax-exempt religious organizations may raise in light
of the Citizens United holding. In doing so, this Note contends that,
based on the general principle espoused in Citizens United, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides a powerful
argument against conditioning the benefit of tax exemptions for
religious organizations on the willingness of those organizations to
give up their First Amendment speech rights. This Note will also
argue, however, that in light of other interests, including adherence
to the Establishment Clause and the long recognized tradition of
separation of church and state, some limits on the political activities
of tax-exempt religious organizations should remain intact,
preventing such organizations from maintaining tax-exempt status if
they engage in completely unfettered political speech or lobbying.
A.

The Distinct Nature of Religious Organizations

At the outset of this analysis it is necessary to place some limits
on the scope of this discussion. While it is true that § 501(c)(3)
provides a tax exemption to many types of organizations—including
nonprofit educational and charitable organizations—this discussion
will focus specifically on religious organizations exempted under
§ 501(c)(3). In doing so, this Note first argues that even though
§ 501(c)(3)’s requirements and restrictions, including the political
activities test, apply to all § 501(c)(3) organizations, in the context
of tax law there are inherent and substantial differences between
religious organizations and all other tax-exempt organizations. This
distinction between tax-exempt religious organizations and all other
tax-exempt organizations is critical to the later analysis that
distinguishes previous Court holdings from any future legal
challenges in light of Citizens.
The Supreme Court considered the unique nature of religious
organizations in the context of tax law when it decided Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York in 1970.141 Walz addressed the question of
whether or not the government could grant a property tax
exemption to religious organizations without violating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.142 In addressing this
141. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
142. Id. at 667.
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issue, the Court also considered its obligation to uphold the “other”
religion clause of the First Amendment—the Free Exercise Clause.
In the words of Chief Justice Burger, “The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between [these] two Religion clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to
a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”143 With this
challenge in mind, the Court felt obligated to use the “play in the
joints” between these two clauses to produce the most neutral
result.144 In the case of Walz, the Court found that the tax
exemption for religious organizations was, in fact, the most neutral
position between the two Religion Clauses and was, therefore,
constitutional. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship [or
a subsidy145] since the government does not transfer part of its
revenue to churches . . . .”146 Additionally, “[t]he exemption creates
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state
and far less than taxation of churches.”147 Under this reasoning, not
only is a tax exemption for religious organizations permissible, it is
the most appropriate way to maintain the neutrality demanded by
the Constitution in matters related to religious organizations. Thus,
this type of reasoning, standing alone, supports the notion that
religious organizations should be dealt with differently than
organizations that do not bring the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment into play. However, the Court in subsequent years has
backtracked somewhat from this stance.
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court, in a decision written
by Justice Brennan, held that a state law granting a sales tax
exemption to religious publications violated the Establishment
Clause because it promoted religion over nonsectarian interests.148 In
doing so, Brennan reasoned that contrary to his own concurring
opinion in Walz, “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy.”149
143. Id. at 668–69.
144. Id. at 669.
145. See id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Tax exemptions and general subsidies . . .
are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in
fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the
subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on
the other hand, involves no such transfer.” (footnotes omitted)).
146. Id. at 675 (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 676.
148. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
149. Id. at 14.
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Thus, if a state subsidizes a religion through a tax exemption but
does not do so for secular groups, it has violated the Establishment
Clause. In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia rejected this reasoning
and called upon the Texas Monthly majority to return to the more
constitutional and historically justified neutrality position from Walz.
“Walz,” argued Scalia, “is just one of a long line of cases in which
[the Court has] recognized that ‘the government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do
so without violating the Establishment Clause.’”150 This position is
supported by the fact that “the exemption of religion from various
taxes ha[s] existed without challenge in the law of all 50 States and
the National Government before, during, and after the framing of
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, and ha[s] achieved
‘undeviating acceptance’ throughout the 200-year history of our
Nation.”151
The principle of neutrality, as used in Walz and Scalia’s dissent in
Texas Monthly, should govern matters of tax law related to religious
organizations, not the standard adopted by the Texas Monthly
majority. The reality is that religions and religious organizations,
particularly churches,152 do hold a unique position in this nation’s
history and under the Constitution and other laws of this nation.153
The very existence of “the Free Exercise Clause exemptions and the
Establishment clause limits seem[s] to presuppose that religion is
special and distinguishable from other forms of philosophy and
speech” in American law and society.154 “In fact, it [would be]
virtually impossible to understand [the American] tradition of
separation of church and state without recognizing that religion
150. Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987)).
151. Id. at 35 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970)).
152. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3)
Exemption of Religious Organizations that Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 715,
728–29 (2009) (arguing that “[a]lthough nearly all religious organizations are eligible for a tax
exemption under § 501(c)(3), only ‘churches . . . ’ are presumed to be private foundations,
and thus, excepted from the notice requirements” of the statute).
153. See id. at 729 (“The tax exemption of religious organizations—specifically,
churches—is deep-rooted in American history.”). This fact is also supported by § 501(c)(3).
Under § 501(c)(3) churches are not required to apply for tax exemption. It is an automatic
benefit conferred on account of the unique position of churches in our nation’s history. Secular
organizations do not receive the same treatment. Rather, under § 501(c)(3) non-churches
must apply for the tax exemption before receiving that benefit. See I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
154. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS J. 303, 304 (2001).
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raises political and constitutional issues not raised by other
institutions or ideologies.”155 As the Court noted in Walz, “Few
concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life,
beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the
government to exercise at the very least [a] kind of benevolent
neutrality towards churches and religious exercise generally . . . .”156
Due to the obvious tension between the two First Amendment
religion clauses, lawmaking bodies and the courts have an obligation
to strike an appropriate balance on issues related to religious
organizations. This same obligation does not exist in matters related
to nonreligious organizations. As such, this distinction between tax
exemptions for religious organizations and those for nonreligious
organizations is critical to this discussion and should guide any
analysis of tax laws related to religious organizations. This distinction
also provides an important mechanism by which several of the
Court’s decisions discussed above can be distinguished in light of
Citizens United. Much of the jurisprudence governing the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions as it relates to the free speech rights of
religious organizations should be reevaluated in light of the
distinctions drawn in Walz and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Texas
Monthly, and in light of the Court’s decision in Citizens United. If
religious organizations do, in fact, hold a unique place in our
nation’s history, as Burger and Scalia argue, the argument can be
made that such organizations should be allowed to exercise First
Amendment free speech rights while still qualifying for § 501(c)(3)
tax exemptions. Part B, below, addresses the legal arguments in favor
of this position by distinguishing previous case law, and Part C
addresses a few of the legal- and policy-based arguments that weigh
against completely eliminating the restrictions of § 501(c)(3).
B. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and § 501(c)(3)
The Court’s decision in Regan v. TWR, along with the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, represents one of
the most significant legal hurdles to any religious organization
hoping to challenge the political activities test of § 501(c)(3). It
155. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 3 (2000).
156. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676–77, quoted in Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS:
Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 145, 149 (2006).
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would appear that, by holding that the political speech restrictions
under § 501(c)(3) do not violate the First Amendment rights of a
nonprofit corporation, the Court effectively slammed the door on
any future challenges to that aspect of the Code. This is not the case,
however. Regan can be distinguished on several grounds in light of
Citizens United, leaving open the possibility that its holding is not
applicable to situations governing religious organizations. There are
two major points on which Regan (and to a lesser degree, Branch)
may be distinguished: 1) the distinction between religious
organizations and all other tax-exempt organizations under
§ 501(c)(3); and 2) the availability, or lack thereof, of less restrictive
alternatives to § 501(c)(3) in light of the new Citizens United
framework. If Regan may, in fact, be distinguished from cases
involving religious organizations, it can be argued that the SpeiserPerry model of unconstitutional conditions is more applicable to
questions governing § 501(c)(3) restrictions for religious
organizations than is the Cammarano framework used in Regan. If
such is the case, this change in models could have a significant
impact on any future challenges to the § 501(c)(3) political activities
test.
1. Regan does not apply with equal force to religious organizations
The argument that the Regan holding does not apply with equal
force to religious organizations is not novel. In fact, that is the very
argument rejected by the majority in Branch Ministries.157 Again, it is
important to note that Branch Ministries was a circuit court decision
and has not been adopted by the Supreme Court, but the decision
does provide some powerful ammunition against any attempt to
distinguish Regan.
The Regan holding, as noted above, did not address tax-exempt
religious organizations.158 Rather, it focused specifically on the rights
of a secular, nonprofit corporation. Under the Walz-Scalia
framework discussed above, this is an important distinction.159 If, as
Walz and Scalia’s Texas Monthly dissent suggest, over 200 years of
history support the unique nature of religious organizations in this
nation’s legal framework, then the “neutrality” approach to the
157. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
158. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
159. See supra Part IV.A.
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taxation of religious organizations should require a much different
analysis than what was provided in Regan. Because Regan dealt
solely with a secular organization, the Court was not forced to
consider the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. Nor was it forced to consider the neutrality between
those clauses, which is provided through tax exemptions for religious
organizations. Had it done so, the Regan Court may very well have
taken a different approach in order to account for the impact that the
revocation of tax exemption could have, not only on free speech
rights, but also on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
It may be argued that the religious/secular distinction would
have made little difference in the analysis based on the fact that the
Branch court considered this distinction and reached largely the
same conclusion as Regan. This argument lacks logical weight,
however, because Branch Ministries was decided well after Regan,
thus requiring the D.C. Circuit to account for the Regan holding
and synthesize its own rule within that framework. Without the
reasoning of Regan, it is possible that the Branch Ministries court
may have reached a very different holding. Given this possibility, and
the fact that the Branch Ministries decision is not binding on the
Supreme Court, it is possible that the Supreme Court would develop
a new line of reasoning on this matter, completely independent of
the majority holding in Regan. This possibility, along with the new
framework emphasizing free speech rights in Citizens United, leaves
the door open for a potentially successful challenge to the
restrictions of § 501(c)(3).
2. The availability of less restrictive alternatives to § 501(c)(3)
The constitutionality of the political activities restriction of
§ 501(c)(3) was largely dependent on the availability of less
restrictive means by which a tax-exempt organization could exercise
free speech rights.160 Without any less restrictive options, “the
lobbying restriction contained in § 501(c)(3) violates the
principle . . . that the government may not deny a benefit to a person
because he exercises a constitutional right.”161 In other words, “in
isolation,” the political activities restriction of § 501(c)(3) violates
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by requiring an
160. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551–54 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
161. Id. at 552 (internal quotations omitted).
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organization to give up its First Amendment free speech rights in
exchange for a governmental benefit.162 The constitutionality of
§ 501(c)(3) was saved only by the fact that § 501(c)(3)
organizations can also create § 501(c)(4) entities, which can legally
engage in certain forms of lobbying. The Branch Ministries court
took this reasoning one step further by arguing that PACs created by
§ 501(c)(4) organizations can engage in practically unlimited
political activities.163 Any significant restrictions on these options
would, however, in the words of Blackmun, “negate the[ir] saving
effect.”164 This issue, therefore, hangs on whether or not, in light of
the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence (including
Citizens United), any further restrictions have been placed on these
political activities.
The short answer to this question is ‘no.’ The IRS itself has not
placed any further restrictions on the free speech right of § 501(c)(3)
religious organizations. However, the mere fact that the Citizens
United holding seems to expand the general free speech rights of all
organizations other than those covered by § 501(c)(3) calls into
question the continuing restrictions on tax-exempt organizations. In
light of the Citizens United decision, which allows for greater First
Amendment rights of corporations and other organizations, the
speech restrictions imposed under § 501(c)(3) are now effectively
more restrictive simply because they have not expanded to meet the
increased free speech rights under the Citizens United framework.
Additionally, it is important to consider the realities of the “less
restrictive” alternatives to § 501(c)(3), which under both Regan and
Branch Ministries save the political activities test of § 501(c)(3) from
being deemed unconstitutional. These options include (1) the
creation of a PAC and (2) the creation of a § 501(c)(4) organization.
Regarding the first option, the Citizens United decision has
made significant changes to the system governing PACs. Although it
is not entirely clear how exactly these changes will affect such
committees, it appears that most corporations will no longer be
required to create PACs in order to participate financially in political
speech. Accordingly, it seems highly inequitable to require any
organization, including a tax-exempt religious organization, to
utilize a PAC in order to exercise its free speech rights when such
162. Id.
163. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
164. Regan, 461 U.S. at 553.
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committees are no longer required for corporations. With the
necessity of creating a PAC effectively eliminated for most
organizations, this option no longer appears to be the “less
restrictive” means that it seemingly was when the Regan and Branch
Ministries cases were decided. Under this new reality, creating a PAC
may no longer provide a viable alternative to the political speech
restrictions of § 501(c)(3). Therefore, this new change under
Citizens United could undermine the reasoning of both Regan and
Branch Ministries and call into question the constitutionality of
§ 501(c)(3)’s limits on political speech.
There are also valid grounds on which to challenge the
determination made by both the Regan and Branch Ministries courts
that the creation of § 501(c)(4) organizations provides an acceptable
“less restrictive” alternative to the limits of § 501(c)(3). This is
especially true in regards to a § 501(c)(3) religious organization.
Although the option of creating a § 501(c)(4) organization is
technically available to § 501(c)(3) religious organizations, in reality
this option is not a practical or reasonable alternative to the limits of
the political activities test of § 501(c)(3). Religious organizations are
inherently different from all non-religious organizations, even those
organizations that are exempt under § 501(c)(3). These inherent
differences make the creation and use of a § 501(c)(4) organization
highly impractical for a religious organization. As discussed above,165
a § 501(c)(4) organization “may engage in an unlimited amount of
lobbying, provided that the lobbying is related to the organization’s
exempt purpose.”166 Although § 501(c)(4) allows for unlimited
lobbying, because such lobbying must be “related to the
organization’s exempt purpose,” this option is largely if not entirely
useless to a tax-exempt religious organization. Under § 501(c)(3), a
religious organization is exempt simply because it is a religious
organization. This is a broad category, with largely undefined
boundaries. As such, it would be difficult to determine when
lobbying relates to a religious organization’s exempt purposes and
when it does not. This reality makes the use of the § 501(c)(4)
structure and its benefits impractical as the less restrictive alternative
the Regan and Branch Ministries courts suggest it is. Because the
benefits intended by § 501(c)(4) do not apply with any practicality
to tax-exempt religious organizations, the creation of a § 501(c)(4)
165. See supra Part III.
166. Reilly & Allen, supra note 126.
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organization is not a less restrictive alternative to the political
activities test of § 501(c)(3), despite what Regan and Branch
Ministries claim. Therefore, the free speech restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3), at least as they apply to tax-exempt religious
organizations, present an unconstitutional conditions problem in
light of the Citizens United decision.
3. Conclusions concerning unconstitutional conditions and
§ 501(c)(3) organizations
Because the Court’s decision in Regan can be distinguished on
the issue of tax exemptions for religious organizations under
§ 501(c)(3), the Speiser-Perry model of unconstitutional conditions
should govern any challenge to the free speech restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3), not the Cammarano-Regan model. This is made
abundantly clear by key language adopted in the Citizens United
decision. In addressing the concern that corporations would be able
to engage in unlimited political speech while continuing to benefit
financially from the special advantages of the corporate form, the
Citizens United Court quoted Scalia’s dissent from a previous case,
which stated, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the
price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment
rights.”167 In other words, simply because “[s]tate law grants
corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual
life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets,” does not mean the state can prohibit speech.168 By
comparison, the special advantages afforded by the State to religious
organizations also may not be conditioned on the forfeiture of First
Amendment rights. Therefore, in light of the Citizens United
holding, and the reasoning on which it is based, the political
activities test of § 501(c)(3) represents an unconstitutional
conditions problem, which may require the loosening of the free
speech restrictions currently placed on tax-exempt religious
organizations.

167. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
168. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–59).
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Arguments Against Allowing Continued Tax Exemption

In light of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, there may be
support for legal challenges to the political activities restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3) as they relate to religious organizations. This possibility
gives rise to the question of how far the political speech rights of taxexempt religious organizations should extend if these challenges
somehow succeed. Where exactly this line should be drawn may be
an issue for another discussion, but it is helpful to touch briefly on a
few of the key considerations that could impact that determination.
This determination will likely depend on how the Court views
the justifications for tax exemptions and how it ultimately decides to
deal with the Establishment Clause and the separation between
church and state. Despite the fact that Citizens United has
strengthened the free speech rights of all organizations, including
tax-exempt religious organizations, concern for maintaining the
separation of church and state under the Establishment Clause may
ultimately prevent the courts from completely overturning the
political activities restrictions of § 501(c)(3) in favor of entirely
unlimited political speech.
Much of the Court’s discussion in Walz centered on the concern
for balancing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment with
the Establishment Clause and whether or not a tax exemption for a
religious organization would upset that balance. The Court
ultimately determined that tax exemptions for religious organizations
are justified not simply because they tend to promote social welfare
and good works performed by religious organizations, but because
they are the best way of maintaining the desired separation between
church and state. By the Court’s reasoning, “the grant of a tax
exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer
part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding
that the church support the state.”169 In other words, by allowing
churches to simply keep their money, rather than forcing them to
contribute to the public coffers, the government minimizes the kind
of involvement that could upset the balance between church and
state. The Court conceded that “a direct money subsidy would be a
relationship pregnant with involvement,” but it found that a tax
exemption did not rise to the level of a direct subsidy.170 The
169. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
170. Id.
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distinction between tax exemptions and direct subsidies is an
important one that has been addressed in a number of post-Walz
decisions.171 This distinction, and its obvious implications on the
issue of the separation of church and state, would play a significant
role in any challenge to the political activities restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3) and any determination regarding the length to which
speech rights of tax-exempt organizations should extend.
If the political activities restrictions of § 501(c)(3) were
eliminated entirely, the balance between church and state upheld in
Walz would be disturbed significantly because it would allow
religious organizations to engage in political speech and lobbying
while still receiving significant tax exemptions by virtue of their
status as religious organizations. The exemptions of § 501(c)(3),
without the accompanying political activities restrictions, would in
effect force the government to pay for the political activities of
religious organizations. Suddenly, such organizations would have
more money in their pockets to intervene in government affairs,
thereby upsetting the balance between church and state. This reality
should raise serious concerns about eliminating the political activities
restrictions of § 501(c)(3) completely, even in light of Citizens
United’s reaffirmation of the First Amendment speech rights of
corporations and other organizations. Perhaps, in the end, the best
way to balance the various interests at stake—including the interests
of the State and those tax-exempt religious organizations affected—
would be to simply extend the rights currently found in § 501(c)(4)
more effectively to religious organizations. In other words, these
competing interests might be most effectively balanced by allowing
religious organizations to engage in political speech so long as it is
related to their religious purpose. As noted above, this standard
would be difficult to define and even more difficult to enforce, but
such a system just may be the best solution to what is an obviously
difficult problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Even under the new First Amendment paradigm created by
Citizens United v. FEC, any challenge to the political activities
restrictions of § 501(c)(3) as applied to tax-exempt religious
organizations will face an uphill battle. Many years of established
171. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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precedent, in addition to a long-standing adherence to the
separation of church and state, will make it difficult for any such
challenge to successfully eliminate the political restrictions of
§ 501(c)(3). Despite this apparent difficulty, the Citizens United
decision has given the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
renewed strength in the argument against conditioning the benefit
of tax exemption for religious organizations on the willingness of
those organizations to give up their First Amendment speech rights.
However, in light of other interests, including adherence to the
Establishment Clause and the long recognized tradition of separation
of church and state, some limits on the political activities of taxexempt religious organizations should remain intact, preventing such
organizations from maintaining tax-exempt status if they engage in
completely unfettered political speech or lobbying.
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